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Specific Performance of Contracts for
Arbitration or Valuation
By ALFRED HAYES'
The doctrine that equity will not specifically enforce contracts
for arbitration or valuation developed more than a hundred years
ago. It has been almost unifornly adhered to, not only in England,
where the doctrine arose, but also generally in the United States.
Two main grounds have been assigned for the rule: (i) The inability
of the court of equity to fully execute any decree which it might make
for specific performance of such an agreement. It is powerless
either to compel a party to perform the discretionary act of choosing
an arbitrator or valuer, or to require such person to act when chosen.
This is simply one application of the rule that equity cannot make a
decree requiring the performance of personal acts calling for the exer-
cise of skill or discretion. (2) The unwillingness of the court to aid
in holding parties to an agreement, the object of which is to exclude
the deternination of controversies by the judicial tribunals.
The first reason seems to be the more persuasive, particularly as
the basis for a distinctive rule of equity relative to specific per-
formance. If the contract calls for the arbitration of controversies
which by the law of a particular jurisdiction cannot be lawfully
withdrawn from the cognizance of the courts, the contract may well
be held invalid both at law and in equity. Doubtless, however,
both of these grounds have been relied upon as a basis for the rule.
In Street v. Rigby,' a case in which a partnership agreement provided
for the reference of disputes to arbitration, Lord Eldon said in 1802
that no instance was to be found of a decree for specific performance
of an agreement to name arbitrators, and that no discussion upon it
had taken place in his experience for twenty-five years. He stated
that in Price v. Williams, other phases of which are reported in
179 o and 179I,2 a case in which he had himself been counsel, Lord
Thurlow was of the opinion that the court would not perform such
an agreement. Apparently Lord Eldon's opinion is based upon the
a Professor of Law in the Cornell University College of Law.
16 Vesey 815 (1802).
23 Bro. C. C. 163 (1790); 1 Vesey 365 (I791).
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difficulties in the way of the court. He mentions as Lord Thur-
low's ground that arbitrators might or might not be able to come to a
decision, and then adds: "The court, if it is not part of the agree-
ment, cannot give them authority to examine upon oath; and the
agreement itself cannot authorize any person to administer an oath."
On the other hand, in the case of Mitchell v. Harrise in 1793 an arbitra-
tion clause in an agreement relative to the smelting of copper ore
was held not a bar to an action at law, the court's decision not turning
on any difficulty as to equitable relief. That the rule was not as
yet firmly established is indicated from the opinion of Sir William
Grant, Master of the Rolls, in Hall v. Warren4 in 1804, in which case
he held that the fact that the defendant vendor had become a lunatic,
thus precluding valuation by nominated persons, did not interfere
with equitable relief. The question has come up most frequently
in connection with cases of this type, namely, those in which there
was a proviso for valuation of property, either by designated persons
or by persons to be nominated by the parties, frequently with a
clause that such parties should, in case of disagreement, select an
umpire. Typical cases refusing specific performance under these
circumstances are MiMes v. Gery,5 Blundell v. Brettargh, and
Agar v. Maclew.7  Any relief on such contracts is difficult in any
form, because, price being an essential term of the contract, and the
parties having agreed upon some specified mode for its determina-
tion, if the court is unable to require the fixing of value in the pre-
scribed way, it will be making a new contract for the parties rather
than enforcing one which they have made, if it substitutes some
method of its own for fixing the price. This difficulty is recognized
in actions at law. 8
32 Vesey Jr. 129 (1793). 49 Vesey 6o5 (1804).
514 Vesey 400 (1807). 617 Vesey 232 (18io).
72 Simons & Stuart 418 (1825); Wilks v. Davis, 3 Mer. 507 (1817); Firth v.
Midland Co., L. R. 20 Eq. loo (1852); Morgan v. Millman, 3 DeG. M & G 124
(1853); Eads v. Williams, 4 DeG. M. & G. 674 (85)4); South Wales Railway
v. Wythes, 5 DeG. M. & G. 880 (1854), semble.8Burdick on Sales (3d ed., 1913), 39, states that in cases where the valuationis to be fixed by a third party "if the chosen arbitrator does not appraise the
property, the contract of sale should be deemed avoided, inasmuch as it was
conditioned upon his performance of the stipulated act; but if the purchaser has
appropriated any of the goods under such a contract, he is liable for a reasonable
p rice; and if the failure of the arbitrator to act is due to the fault of either party,
he is liable for damages to the other."
Williston on Sales (i909), section 174: "The requirement of valuation is in
such a case an express condition or a condition implied in fact, qualifying the
obligation of the buyer to pay the price. Instead of promising to pay a specified
price or a reasonable price, he promises to pay such price only as the valuers
shall fix. In the nature of the case this promise cannot be performed unless the
valuation first takes place." "
The New York Sales Act (chapter 571, laws of 1911), section 91, has the follow-
ing provision: "Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods at a price or
ARBITRATION OR VALUATION CONTRACTS 227
Lord Justice Fry thus states the rule as to valuation: 9
"Where the contract appoints a way of determining the price, the
courts have, in some cases, deemed that way essential; in other cases
they have deemed it non-essential, and have treated the contract
as essentially one to sell at a fair price. In all cases where the prin-
cipal subject of a contract is to be valued in a specific manner, the
manner has, it is believed, been held essential; the manner has often
been held non-essential where it has applied only to an incident
of the main subject, as timber to land, fixtures to a house, or plant
to a business."
"Where the contract specifies a way of ascertaining the price,
which is essential, the contract is conditional until the ascertain-
ment, and is absolute only when the price has been determined in
the manner agreed upon. In case of default in this respect, the con-
tract remains imperfect and incapable of being enforced, for the
court will never direct the payment of such a sum as A. may fix."
In Pomeroy on Specific Performance of Contracts (2d ed., 1897),
the same principle is thus stated at section 149: "It is a settled
doctrine that whenever the price is thus made to depend upon the
decision of valuers, or upon any other future action or event, the con-
tract is not completed and will not be enforced until the price has
been actually fixed in the manner provided, or in some equivalent
manner satisfactory to the court. A decree of specific perform-
ance will never be made ordering payment of such an amount as
.certain arbitrators may thereafter award."
The same rule, both as to agreements for arbitration and for ap-
-praisal, was early recognized in the United States and has been
generally followed.' 0
on terms to be fixed by a third person, and such third person, without fault of
the seller or the buyer, cannot or does not fix the price or terms, the contract
or the sale is thereby voided, but if the goods or any part thereof have been
delivered to and appropriated by the buyer, he must pay a reasonable price
therefor. Where such third person is prevented from fixing the price or terms
by the buyer or the seller, the party not in fault may have such remedies against
the party in fault as are allowed by the appropriate parts of this article."9Fry, Specific Performance, sections 355, 356.10Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 Story 8oo (1845); Manning v. Ayers, 77 Fed.
690 (1897); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 157 Ala. ri9 (I9o8); Preston v. Smith, 67 11.
App. 613 (1896); Saimt v. Martel, 127 La. 73 (191o); Noyes v. Marsh, 123
Mass. 286 (1877); Miles v. Schmidt, 168 Mass. 339 (I897); City of St. Louis v.
St. Louis Co., 70 Mo. 69 (1879); Ferrell v. Ferrell, 253 Mo. 167 (1913), in which
case Judge Brown says, without dissent, "Nothing is better settledthan that an
agreement to name arbitrators cannot be specifically enforced;" Woodruff v.
Woodruff, 44 N. J. Eq. 349 (1888); Smith v. Compton, 20 Barb, (N. Y.) 262
(I855); Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N. Y. 49I (1858); Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Stevenson, 214 N. Y. 488 (i915), semble; Conner v. Drake, i Ohio St. 166 (1853);
Pillow v. Pillow, 3 Humphrey (Tenn.) 644 (i842); Baker v. Glass, 6 Munf. (Va.)
212 (I818). The rule is somewhat uncertainly stated in Schneiderv. Hildebrand,
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The effect of the rule, however, has been very greatly modified,
both by a number of well defined exceptions in its application, and
to some extent by statute,
I. Where the clause as to arbitration or valuation relates to some
subsidiary or non-essential term, the court will nevertheless grant
specific performance. While; of course, the court of equity is no
better able to enforce such a provision where it relates to some
minor term of the contract than in any other case, the doctrine is
well settled that in certain cases specific performance of a contract
in a modified form from that agreed upon by the parties can be
enforced, as in the well-known instance of performance with compen-
sation where there is a partial defect. Such performance may
be granted either at the instance of the vendor or vendee. In several
of the cases where a valuation clause was thus disregarded, the court
argued, in support of its position, from the analogy to performance
with compensation. This is substantially the position of Lord
Hatherly in Richardson v. Smith,""a which is a bill by the purchaser
for the performanceof a contract for the saleof an estate for £24,000,
the furniture and other articles on the estate to be valued. Such
articles were worth about £2,ooo. The vendor refused to appoint
a valuer, but the contract was enforced as to the estate without
reference to the other articles. This modification of the rule is
thus stated in the article on Specific Performance in Lord Hals-
bury's Laws of England, published in 1913, an article for which Sir
Edward Fry takes responsibility, along with Mr. R. A. Wright:
"Where the thing to be valued is subsidiary to the main purpose
of the contract, the court treats the mode of valuation as non-
essential, and the contract as one for sale at a fair price, as for ex-
ample, in the case of a provision for the valuation of furniture or of
plant and machinery; similarly, where partnership articles provide
for a valuation when the partnership expires, the particular mode may
be treated as non-essential, and the court provides for the fixing of a
reasonable value."
Mr. Pomeroy says : "The tendency of the later English decisions
is to consider these stipulations for a determination of the price by
14 Tex. Civ. App. 34 (1896). In a number of these cases the refusal of equity to
act has been definitely grounded on the illegality of a general arbitration agree-
ment. Saunt v. Martel, supra; Miles v. Schmidt, supra; Smith v. Compton,
supra. In part Greasonv. Keteltas was based upon this ground, and in Meacham
v. Jamestown Company, 211 N. Y. 346 (1914), a stipulation in a contract that
the engineer of a railroad company should determine all disputes was held in-
valid as ousting the courts of jurisdiction by the convention of the parties.
10ar Ch. 648 (1870).
UPomeroy's Specific Performance of Contracts, section 151.
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third persons rather as matters of form than of substance; to con-
strue them in such manner that they become incidental only to the
main object of the agreement.
An examination of the English cases does not indicate any such
tendency where the provision as to valuation relates to the principal
subject matter of the sale, unless it be incident to some other contract,
such as a partnership agreement."
Where the agreement can be construed as a sale at a fair value,
of course, specific performance can be given.13 The result is the same
if the parties provide for jfidicial determination of value in case the
method by appraisal breaks down.' 4
Where the clause does not directly relate to value, but to some
preliminary determination as to quantity or quality upon which
the price depends, or some clause not affecting price, the question
may arise as to whether such a term is essential. It would-seem that
a difference might well be drawn between a determination where the
principle was clearly fixed, as in the case of a mere question of quan-
tity. Where price, however, is dependent upon a determination
of quality, involving skill or discretion, the same objection to the
court adopting another mode for determining such question than
12The cases cited by Mr. Pomeroy are: Binham v. Bradford, L. R. 5 Ch. 518
(1870), where a partnership agreement contained a provision for purchase at the
termination of partnership on a valuation. In giving specific performance,
Lord Hatherly not only xelies upon the fact th. t the property has been fully
enjoyed by the partnership, but also on the ground that the clause was incidental.
He says: "But here is a man who has had the whole benefit of the partnership
in respect to which this agreement is made, and now he refuses to have the rest
of the agreement performed on account of the difficulty which has arisen. It is
much more like the case of an estate sold and the timber on a part to be taken at
a valuation. The adjustment of matters of that sort forming a part of the
arrangement but by no means being the substance of the agreement, and in cases
such as these the court has found no difficulty."
Richardson v. Smith, 5 Ch. 648 (1870), as stated supra; Smith v. Peters, L. R.
2o Eq. 511 (1875), similar to the case of Richardson v. Smith, where the agree-
ment was for the sale of a lease of a public house for £10,700, the furniture and
fixtures to be taken at a valuation. Sir George jessel, Master of the Rolls, says:
"There is no evidence that the value of the fixtures and furniture was so large as
to be an essential portion of the contract." He also comments on the refusal
of the defendant to permit the valuation to be taken. Other English cases where
the arbitration clause did not relate to the principle subject matter of the sale are:
Jackson v. Jackson, i Sm. & Gif. I54 (1853); Paris Chocolate Co. v. Crystal
Palace Co., 3 Sm. & Gif. "19 (1854).
Cases in the United States involving a similar principle are: Union Pacific
Co. v. Chicago Co., 5I Fed. 309 (1892), where in a contract for the joint use by
rilroad companies of a joint bridge over a river there was a stipulation for the
regulation of schedules by referees; Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. I (I89O), regula-
tions for use of railroad tracks; Burton v. Landon, 66 Vt. 361 (1894), principal
agreement being for the settlement of a suit; Kipp v. Hann, 146 Wis. 591 (1911),
real estate of manufacturing company sold for $82,000, other assets to be valued.
'
3Meyer v. Jenkins, 8o Ark. 209 (19o6).
'
4Springer v. Boardman, 154 Ill. 668 (1895).
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that agreed upon by the parties applies as in the case of valuation.
In Hutton v. Moore5 a provision for the grading of cotton and the
fixing of its price was held an essential condition. In the case of the
Southern Timber Company v. Doyle,"6 which was a bill by the vexidor
for enforcement of a contract for the sale of standing timber at $2.00
per thousand feet for all merchantable timber of certain specified
varieties, the court decreed rescission. The court, however, suggests
the somewhat refined distinction that this result is reached because
the parties had agreed upon named estimators, namely, C. A. Schenck
& Co., and the result might well have been otherwise had the provi-
sion been simply for the selection of estimators. This suggested
distinction would seem to be an undue refinement neither warranted
by the cases nor supportable in principle. In Howison v. Bartlett 7
the bill was for specific performance of a sale of certain timber land
at $6.oo per acre, with a provision that the premises were to be sur-
veyed by some competent surveyor, to be mutually agreed upon.
This provision, although it related to the principal subject matter
of the contract, was held non-essential. There are few cases
similar to this, and the result can only be sustained on the principle
that a survey to determine quantity is a purely mechanical act.
In the following cases specific performnanci was refused, the proviso
relating to some material term other than valuation: Gourley v.
Duke of Somerset,18 in which a lease was to contain all such usual and
proper agreements as might be judged reasonable by John Gale;
and Tillet v. The Charing Cross Company,19 a contract for the pur-
chase of certain leaseholds where named persons were to decide in
case of difference as to the character of houses to be erected. In this
case Sir John Romilly, Master of the Rolls, says: "Now here
undoubtedly this is not a case of price, but the question is the same
if the mode in which the houses were to be rebuilt is an essential
part of the contract, and I think it is."
A like result was reached in a very late case in which the solicitors
of the purchaser of a leasehold house were to approve the title to
and the covenants contained in the lease, the title from the free-
holder, and the form of contract.20 Similarly, specific performance
was refused where the contract was for the purchase of io,ooo acres
of land, to be designated by the defendants,2' and where one-half
share of stock was to be transferred to a friend to be agreed upon.2
1526 Ark. 382 (1870). 16204 Fed. 829 (1912).
17141 Ala. 193 (1904); similar result'on second appeal, 147 Ala. 408 (19o6);
Omaha Lumber Co. v. Co-operative Investment Co., 55 Colo. 27! (1913) is a like
case (quantity of merchantab!e timber to be determined by cruisers).
1819 Vesey 429 1815). 1926 Beav. 419 (1859).
uVan Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg v. Alexander, L. R. (1912), 1 Ch. 284.
2 1Alabama Mineral Co. v. Johnson, 121 Ala. 72 (1898).
22Kennedy v. The Monarch Manufacturing Co., 123 Ia. 344 (i9o4).
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II. Acts may have been performed under the contract creating
such an equity that the court must give some relief in spite of a
proviso for valuation.
Most of the cases where the valuation clause is spoken of as inci-
dental may be explained on the ground that they are contracts
which would be performed without reference to the valuation of
some minor sort of property, the transfer of which is unimportant
as compared with the principal subject matter of the contract.
Certain cases, while referable in part to the same doctrine, may
perhaps be more strongly grounded on the principle that the parties
by performance have put themselves into a position which neces-
sitates equitable relief. Thus, in such a case as Binham v. Bradford,
supra, the partnership had been fully enjoyed and some disposition
of the partnership assets necessarily had to be made. In Castle
Creek Company v. City of Aspen,1 a water company was allowed to
enforce specifically a contract for the purchase of a system of water
works where the city, at the expiration of a twenty-year period,
had given notice of its election to purchase. By the contract the
price was to be determined by appraisers. The court overruled
a demurrer on the ground that the contract to sell did not stand
alone, but was simply a subsidiary part of another contract for a
more extensive purpose. Such contract had been in part performed.
Another case based on the same principle is Bristol v. The Bristol
Company.'
A very large number of cases have arisen where leases have pro-
vided either for a renewal upon a rental to be fixed by appraisers,
or for the sale of improvements upon the expiration of the lease,
the value of which was to be similarly determined. It is obvious
that in such cases it would be grossly inequitable either to permit
the lessor to appropriate improvements without payment, or to allow
a lessee to continue in the enjoyment of premises when the rental
value might have largely increased. While equity is powerless to
secure the valuation in the prescribed manner, it must in some way
work out the equities of the parties. The only question is, What
shall the remedy be? The sound solution, Lnd the one which has
been very generally adopted, is to ignore the provision as to mode of
valuation, the court itself fixing value. The court in such a case is
not enforcing the contract. The contract has failed. The court
is merely protecting the parties from injustice.
In an early English case dealing with the problem, Gregory v.
Mighell,2 in which the rent was to be fixed by arbitrators, the lessor
23I46 Fed. 8 (I9O6). 24ig R. I. 413 (x896). 258 Vesey 328 (18ix).
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had refused to sign the arbitration bonds. Sir William Grant,
Master of the Rolls, says: "That is a case in which the failure of
the arbitrators to fix the rent can never affect the agreement. It
is in part performed and the court must find some means of com-
pleting its execution; as I have already said, the plaintiff is not to
be considered as a trespasser. Some rent he must pay; the amount
must be fixed in some other mode; and it seems to me, that it should
be ascertained by the master without sending it to another arbitra-
tion; which might possibly end in the same way."
In a large number of American cases under these circumstances
the court has itself determined the value of buildings which have
been erected or the amount of rental which should be paid upon
r~newal.2s
In a number of cases the courts appear to have taken the position
that enforcement of the agreement for valuation must be given in
cases of this type.2 7  These cases apparently proceed on the theory
that specific performance is not impossible in such cases, but that it
is merely declined on the grounds that ordinary inadequacy of
the legal remedy is not sufficient to induce the court to undertake
the task of enforcing an arbitration. This result is similar to that
reached in cases requiring performance of contracts calling for
continuous acts. While ordinarily in such cases equity declines
relief, it has granted performance in a few cases relating to railroads,
where the public interest is deemed to counterbalance the incon-
28Biddle v. Ramsey, 52 Mo. 153 (1873); I-lug v Van Burk-aleo, 58 Mo. 202
(1874); Strohmaier v. Zeppenfeld, 3 Mo. App. 429 (1877); Robinson v. Keteltas, 4
Edw. Ch. (N.Y.)67 (1842); Dunnell v.Keteltas, 16 Abb. Pr. (N.Y. )205 (i863);
Kelso v. Kelly, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 419 (1865); Viany v. Ferran, 5 Abb. Pr. N. S.(N. Y.) IIO (x868); Weir v. Barker, i04 App. Div. (N. Y.) 112 (i9O5); Mutual
Life Insurance Company v. Stevens, 214 N. Y. 488 (1915). This case held that
specific performance to secure an appraisal of the value of the demised premises
could not be granted. By the contract, on the making of such appraisal, the
lessee was to have an option of purchase. The plaintiff had not yet elected to
make the purchase. Judge Miller explains the cases in which equity has given
relief upon leases on the ground that the provision for appraisal is incidental and
subsidiary tc the substantive part of the agreement. Since the appraisal re-
lates to the principal subject matter of the contract, this explanation of cases
seems less satisfactory than recognition of the necessity of fixing the value be-
cause of the equity created by performance. Lowe v. Brown, 22 Ohio St. 462
(1872); Kaufmann v. Liggett, 209 Pa. 87 (1904). The court here recognizes
the true grounds for the rule, saying, "The grossest inequity would be worked
otherwise." Grosvenor v. Flint, 2o R. I. 21 (1897); Richardson v. Harkness
59 Wash. 474 (191o); Hopkins v. Gilman, 22 Wis- 476 (1868); Schneider v.
Reed, 123 Wis. 488 (Igo5).2
'Gunton v. Carroll, ioI U. S. 426 (1879) (demurrer overruled); Destructor
Co. v. City of Atlanta, 219 Fed. 996 (1914) (motion to dismiss); Tscheider v.Bid-
dle, 4 Dillon 58 (1877) (demurrer overruled); Coles v. Peck, 96 Ind. 333 (1884)
(demurrer overruled); Herrman v. Babcock, io3 Ind. 461 (1885) (demurrer over-
ruled.)
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venience to the court involved in enforcement.28  In these cases,
however, while the courts hold that equitable relief will be
given, it is not very clear precisely what form such relief will
take. In Tscheider v. Bidle, supra, Judge Dillon stays the
prosecution of a law action for rent, the amount of which was
to be fixed, and says that. this order "does not contravene
the principle contended for by the defendant, that before there
can be a decree for renewal, the rental must be fixed by arbitrators
and cannot be fixed by the court, since the object of the rule or order
is to compel the defendant (lessor) to himself appoint the assessor
who is to represent him. If he appoints an impartial person, with-
out instructions, and he is met with an impartial appointment by the
lessee, it is probable that an agreement as to the rental will be
reached."
Several New York cases seem to indicate that in case of default
by either the lessor or lessee, under-such an agreement, the court
will indirectly coerce performance of the contract, although it could
not make such a decree directly. Thus in Wells v. DeLeyer,29 in
which there was a lease for five years at a rental of $ioo per year,
with a right of renewal at a rental to be fixed by arbitration, Judge
Daly says that, if the lessor had failed to appoint an arbitrator,
the lessor could secure a renewal at the old rate, and that, as in this
case the lessee has neglected to act, the lessor may hold him for
$200 per year, having given notice of such intention. In Johnson v.
Conger,30 the lessor having declined to take part in the arbitration
to fix rental, Ingraham; P. J., says: "We think a court of equity
can compel the parties to perform this covenant of renewal. If the
landlord declines to name an arbitrator on his part, the same can
be ascertained by the court or the lease renewed at the old rent."
Similarly in the recent case of Van Beuren v. Wotherspoon3' the les-
sor, upon the expiration of a lease, having failed to act, it was said
that the continuance of the lessees in possession must be regarded
as under the lease, and that until the plaintiffs had exercised their
election either to renew or take the building on the premises, the
lessees were liable only for the original rent. This principle seems
very much like that applied in the cases where the negative agreement
of an actor or other person rendering unique services not to perform
for a rival manager is enforced, although such negative clause is
part of a single contract for the rendition of services, which the court.
2 8Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. i (289o); Union Co. v. Chicago Co. 163 U. S. 564(1896).
291 Daly (N. Y.) 39 (186o). 3024 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 95 (1861).
3164 N. Y. 368 (igoo).
THE CORAELL LAW QUARTERLY
of equity is powerless to enforce in its entirety. The court, by im-
posing pecuniary loss upon the defaulting party, indirectly coerces
such party. There would be no objection to this, were the court
simply denying relief to a party declining to do an act of such a
nature that the court could require its performance, but, since neither
a new rental arbitrarily fixed by a lessor, nor the old rental, bears
any relation to the actual value of the premises, such a course seems
merely to penalize a defaulting contractor in an arbitrary amount.
Either the court should enforce the contract for valuation, or if
this is not possible, it should itself determine what equitable relief
is demandable by the situation.
III. In England, where this doctrine arose, the situation has been
very substantially altered by statute. Section it of the Common
Law Procedure Act 32 provided that, where by agreement any condi-
tions were to be referred to arbitration, a suit commenced by any of
the parties might be stayed, and section 12 gave authority to judges
of the superior courts to appoint arbitrators or umpires. In numer-
ous cases this statutory remedy has been acted upon.-"
The relief under the statute was given even in a case where by a
partnership agreement disputes were to be referred to a foreign body,
namely, to the Commercial Court of St. Petersburg.4 Substantially
the same provisions are embodied in a later English statute, the Arbi-
tration Act of i889 .11 The right to the enforcement of such an
arbitration is not absolute; the application may be refused by the
court for sufficient reason, and has been so refused in a number of
cases..6 In some cases the court directs that some portion of the
controversy be determined by arbitration, while retaining control
of the action in other respects.3 7  Sir Edward Fry states that the
32Chap. 125, 17 & I8 Victoria (1854). "3Seligmann v. LeBoutillier, L. R. I C. P. 681 (1866); Willesford v. Watson,
L. R. 14 Eq. 572 (1870); Plews v. Baker, I6 Eq. 564 (1873); Newton v. Taylor,
L. R. i9 Eq. 14 (1874); Gillett v. Thornton, L. R. 39 Eq. 599 (1875); Russell v.
Russell, 14 Ch. Div. 471 (1879); Hack v. London Provident Building Society,
L. R. 23 Ch. Div. 3o3 (1883); Municipal Bldg. Society v. Kent, 9 App. Cases
26o (1884); Brierley Board v. Pearson, 9 App. Cases 595 (1884).34Law v. Garrett, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 26 (3877).
3552 & 53 Victoria, chap. 49. A case involving the dissolution of a partnership
of two physicians to which this act was applied is Vawdrey v. Simpson, L. R.
1896, 1 Ch. 166.36Lyon v. Johnson, L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 579 (1889), question between physicians
who were partners as to whether a certain lady was a patient and whether a
bequest from her was a pecuniary emolument under the terms of the partnership
articles; Klegg v. Klegg, L. R. 44 Ch. Div. 200 (x889), directing that the applica-
tion for arbitration stand over until after the basis for defense appeared; Barnes v.
Youngs, L. R. 3898, I Ch. 434, claim of fraud; Bonnin v. Neame, L. R. 39o,
i Ch. 732, arbitrators had expressed strong opinions.
" Pini v. Roncoroni, L. R. 3892, 1 Ch. 633, application for receiver granted;
Ives & Barker v. Willans, L. R. 1894, 2 Ch. 478, arbitration ordered except
as to certain matters outside of the contract.
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Common Law Procedure Act was applicable only to arbitrators
appointed to settle a previously existing dispute and did not apply to
valuers who are to ascertain the value of the subject matter of a
sale, and he conceives that this is also true of the Arbitration Act."'
This conclusion was arrived at in Collins v. Collins,39 a case involving
a contract for the sale of a brewery and plant at a price to be fixed
by arbitrators and an umpire. The same rule was applied in
In Re Dawdy.40 Similarly in Matter of Cavus-Wilson & Greene,41.
in holding that a provision for the fixing of valuation of timber upon
the sale of land was not one for arbitration, Lord Esher states that
an arbitration is to settle a dispute which has arisen; a valuation
is to ascertain a matter in order to prevent disputes arising. The
opposite result was reached by the House of Lords in a Scottish
case in which the court said that English law and usage was not
concerned.42
IV. In the discussion thus far no distinction has been drawn be-
tween cases where the arbitration fails without the fault of the
parties, as, for example, through the inability of the valuers to act
or agree, or the death of a party or arbitrator, and those cases in
which one of the parties first declines to carry out the arbitration.
If the ground for the declination of equity to enforce these contracts
is its powerlessness, it would seem that a decree would be equally
futile, whether the failure of the arbitration was with or without the
consent of the parties. If the misconduct was simply in preventing
the valuers from entering upon the premises or proceeding with the
valuation, while there would be no difficulty in the way of equity's
enjoining such interference, and possibly this could be justified on
the theory that the contract for valuation was subsisting and was in
process of performance, it would seem that equity should decline
to intervene, since it is powerless to compel the valuers to proceed,
and hence cannot give any assurance that the contract will be per-
formed in its entirety. That one of the parties is in default would
seem to be no reason why equity should discard their agreement as
to a specific mode of valuation and substitute some term of its own
for the condition agreed to by the parties. This view is taken
by a number of text writers. Thus, Sir Edward Fry says:
"If the contract be between A. and B. to sell and buy at such a price
as valuers to be named by them shall fix, it seems that either A. or B.
'sFry, Specific Performance, section 359. 3926 Beav. 306 (1858).
4015 Q. B. D. 426 (1885). 4118 Q. B. D. 7 (1886).
42Stewart v. Williamson, i91o App. Cases 455.
'Fry, Specific Performance, section 357.
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may refuse to name a valuer, and the contract will remain incapable
of completion without any liability on the part of the refusing party.
But if the contract between A. and B. be to sell and buy at such a
price as C. shall fix, neither A. nor B. can rightfully prevent C.'s deter-
ruination and the completion of the contract: and it is presumed
that an action might be maintained for such prevention."
Mr. Bogert" states that the English cases illustrate the principle
that withoat the valuation the contract of sale is void and inoperative,
and says: "In England specific performance will not be granted
where valuation has been prevented by the act of one party."
Similarly Mr. Williston45 says: "If either party was to select a
valuer, or notify a man selected for a valuer, or submit property to
valuation, and fails to do so, he has broken his contract; he is,
therefore, liable in damages. Specific performance will not, how-
ever, be given of such a contract. This is in accordance with the
general principle of equity denying specific performance of all kinds
of agreements for arbitration."
Mr. Pomeroy,4 while stating the same rule, suggests that its cor-
rectness may, in the light of recent English decisions, be well doubted.
In Wilks v. Davis,47 although the defendant had refused to execute
the arbitration bond, specific performance was refused. And a
like result was reached in Vickers v. Vickers, 4s where a partner was
to have an option of repurchase upon a valuation. Two valuers had
been appointed, but the defendant altered his mind and would not
allow the valuation to be proceeded with. Vice-Chancellor Wood
says that the only persons who can act are the persons thus to be
named. Apparently in Morse v. Merest,49 however, the vendor
having refused to allow the three valuers to make the valuation at the
time prescribed, was not allowed to take advantage of this. By a like
holding in Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Stevens, supra, it was
held that, owing to the defendant's refusal to name an appraiser,
the plaintiff's time to exercise his option had not expired. In Smith v.
Peters, supra, where performance of a contract to sell a lease of a
public house for £10,700, the furniture and fixtures to be taken at a
valuation, the defendant having refused to permit the valuation to be
taken, was granted, Sir George Jessel not only rests the case upon
the ground that the provision as to the furniture was a subsidiary
term of the contract, but also expresses the opinion that in Vickers v.
Vickers Vice-Chancellor Wood intended to say that if a party pre-
44Bogert, The Sale of Goods in New York, pp. 47-48.
4,Williston on Sales, section 176.4
'Pomeroy, section 15O. 473 Mer. 507 (1817).48L. R. 4 Eq. 529 (1867). '96 Maddock 26 (1821).
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vented valuation, substitution could be made in order to give effect
to the bona fides of the contract. It would not seem that such a
construction can fairly be placed upon the opinion in Vickers v.
Vickers.
Several American cases have dealt with the same aspect of the
problem. While it has been held that a person will not be allowed
in equity to take advantage of his own misconduct,1 0 the complainant
having defeated the execution of the agreement while waiting for
the land sold to rise in value, default does not do away with the neces-
sity for the performance of a condition upon which liability under
the contract is dependent. Thus, in Elberton Hardware Co. v.
Hawes5 the court declined to permit an action for damages for breach
of contract where the value of a stock of hardware was to be fixed
by two named valuers. One of said persons refused to act, such re-
fusal being caused by the act of the defendant. Fish, P. J., says:
"The defendant may have rendered himself liable to the plaintiff
in damages by preventing the valuers named in the written agreement
from valuing the stock in accordance therewith and thus rendering
the contract complete, but it cannot be held that by so doing he has
estoprped himself from claiming that the contract had not become
complete."
Both as a matter of principle and authority the following general
conclusions seem warranted:
(i) Equity will decline to enforce a contract containing a clause
for arbitration or valuation unless such clause relates to some sub-
sidiary or incidental provision of the contract.
(2) Where part performance has so affected the position of
parties that an independent equity has been created, equity will
prevent injustice, the court itself making any necessary determina-
tion as to value or other controverted term.
(3) In England, by statute, agreements as to arbitration of dis-
putes may be enforced, but such statutory provisions are not appli-
cable to clauses providing for valuation.
(4) The declination of equity to give specific performance is
not affected by the fact that one of the parties has lawfully prevented
arbitration or valuation. It is powerless to require such a party to
appoint a valuer, and even if the interference with valuation could
be prevented by injunction, since the court cannot be certain of its
ability to enforce the entire contract, it should not intervene when
such intervention may, in the end, prove to have been futile.
-OPillow v. Pillow, 3 Humphrey (Tenn.) 644 (i842).
51I22 Ga. 858 (19o5). Alabama Mineral Land Co. v. Jackson, 121 Ala. 172
(1898), is a somewhat similar case.
